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NOTES
Antitrust Law- Tying Agreements, The "Per Se" Rule,
and Credit
Fortner Enterprises entered into a credit agreement whereby U.S. Steel
Homes Credit Corp. was to provide 100 per cent financing for Fortner's
purchase and development of land for the construction of private homes.
For each of the lots purchased with the loan proceeds, Fortner was to
purchase a prefabricated steel home from U.S. Steel Corp., the credit
corporation's parent. Fortner claimed that the prefabricated materials
were priced unreasonably high and were defective and unusable. Follow-
ing an unsuccessful attempt to be released from the agreement, Fortner
brought suit against U.S. Steel and U.S. Steel Homes Credit Corp. under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' In the suit Fortner sought treble
damages for lost profits and an injunction against enforcement of the re-
quirement that it purchase the prefabricated homes from U.S. Steel.
Fortner alleged that the defendants were conspiring to restrain and monop-
olize trade in the sale of prefabricated homes through its tying agreement
requiring the purchase of homes (the tied product) in order to obtain
credit (the tying product). The district court granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment, holding that no showing was made that defend-
ants enjoyed sufficient market power over the tying product (credit), and
that a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product (the homes)
was foreclosed.! The court of appeals affirmed without opinion.' Held, re-
versed and remanded: (1) The standards relied on by the district court are
necessary only to bring the doctrine of per se illegality into operation;
a plaintiff can still prevail on the merits whenever he can prove, on the
basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the
practices involved, that the general standards of the Sherman Act have
been violated. (2) "Sufficient economic power" does not require that the
defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the
market for the tying product. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1969).
I. GOVERNMENTALLY IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS PRACTICES
With the general purpose of maintaining market competition," Con-
gress has imposed restrictions on business through antitrust legislation. The
Sherman Act of 1890 was the first, and remains the most important, leg-
islative restriction on business activities.' As authorized by this Act and
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). Section 1 states in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... "
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
'Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968).
' V. MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 32 (4th ed. 1965). See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1-2 (1955).
5 V. MUND, siipra note 4, at 98.
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subsequent legislation, various types of business activities have come under
attack through actions taken by the federal government and through
private litigation in suits for treble damages or for injunctions.
The Clayton Act, which supplements the Sherman Act, specifies certain
types of activities that are illegal, one of which is the tying agreement
when that agreement causes a substantial injury to competition.' Signifi-
cantly, under section 3 of the Clayton Act the proscription of tying agree-
ments is limited to the lease or sale of "goods, wares, merchandise, machin-
ery, supplies, or other commodities"' as the tying product when tied to an-
other product of similar nature.' A tying agreement has been subsequently
defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product [the tying prod-
uct] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different
(or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier."'
Prior to the Clayton Act, tying agreements had been upheld as valid
and not in violation of the antitrust laws in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co."0
This case was decided on the basis of the "rule of reason" test first stated
by the United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States."
The rule of reason was explained as a test that would allow the Court in-
dependent determination, on a case-by-case examination, of the harmful
or beneficial economic effect of the particular business activity under scru-
tiny. This was required, reasoned the Court, because the Sherman Act did
not specifically define what acts were in restraint of trade." After passage
of the Clayton Act and its specific proscription of some tying agreements,
the Court in Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co.," following the
statutory language of that Act, held a tying agreement illegal and thus
overturned A.B. Dick."
6 Clayton Act S 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
7 Id.
$Hence, a tying agreement involving a tying product that is not one of the specifically listed
items is not necessarily illegal under the Clayton Act. In addition to the Clayton Act, the Federal
Trade Commission Act, passed the same year (1914) was intended to supplement the Sherman
Act in stopping in their incipiency unfair trade practices that hindered competition. For a
Sherman Act violation the illegal activities had to be fullblown. V. MuND, supra note 4, at 209.
Specifically of importance is section 5 (a) of this Act: "Unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. S
45(a)(1) (1964).
9 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
10 224 U.S. 1 (1912). See also Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.,
77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
it221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12 Id. at 60. It was argued that the rule of reason had to be read into the Act because every
contract in business restrains the parties to that contract in some way. See note I supra. Without
the rule of reason commerce would have become impossible.
'a243 U.S. 502 (1916).
14 1d. at 517-18. See text accompanying notes 15, 22, 25, and 26 infra for a discussion of tying
agreements that were subsequently held illegal in various situations under both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. But, even in actions under the Clayton Act not all tying agreements have been held
illegal. In Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), at issue was a contract
between a refiner of petroleum products and a retail dealer. The refiner undertook to furnish a
tank and pump free, or at less than cost, for handling the product sold by the retail dealer on
condition that should the equipment be used for any other purpose than swring and handling the
product of the refiner the right to the equipment should terminate. The contract was held by the
C ourt as not beinS in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act.
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II. TYING AGREEMENTS AND THE "PER SE" RULE
In 1947 the Supreme Court in International Salt Co. v. United States's
dealt tying agreements another serious blow. In an action brought by
the United States under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the
Clayton Act, the Court affirmed summary judgment against the defendant
enjoining it from placing certain restrictions on lease agreements of its
patented salt processing machines. The agreements required the lessee to
purchase from the defendant all unpatented salt and salt tablets used by
one type of machine, and on a different machine allowed the lessee to pur-
chase salt of equal grade from any competitor provided the defendant was
not able to meet the competitor's price. In holding that "it is unreasonable,
per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market,"'" the Court
avoided the necessity of first determining whether or not the agreed-to re-
straint was unreasonable within the Sherman Act. The Court added that
"[t]he volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be
insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to
accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious."'" Concerning the agreement
giving the lessee the option to purchase from a competitor if the defendant
could not meet the price, the Court held that this did "not avoid the
stifling effect of the agreement on competition." ' Hence, both tying agree-
ments were held to be in and of themselves illegal."
The present test of the illegality of tying agreements was established
in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States." Northern Pacific had leased
and sold land along its right of way on condition that the lessee or grantee
ship over Northern Pacific's lines all commodities produced or manufac-
tured on the land, provided that its rates were "equal to those of compet-
ing carriers."" The Government filed suit seeking a declaration that North-
ern Pacific's "preferential routing" agreements were "unreasonable re-
straints of trade under section 1 of [the Sherman] Act."'" In affirming
summary judgment against the defendant, Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the majority, set out the test for determining whether or not a tying
agreement was a per se violation: It must be shown that (1) the defendant
has "sufficient economic power [over the tying product] to impose an
appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product," and (2)
tthat a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected.""12
" 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
" Id. at 396.
" Id. International Salt Co. was the country's largest industrial salt producer. Id. at 394.
"8 Id. at 397.
" Two years later in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), in distinguishing
between a requirements contract (whereby the buyer is bound to purchase all of his requirements
of a particular product from one seller) and a tying agreement, the Court was constrained to limit
the rule laid down by International Salt to tying agreements. The Court noted that there were
imoortant economic differences between the two and that tving agreements were of greater economic
harm. Id. at 305-07. The Court said that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond
the suppression of competition." Id. at 305-06. Hence, the Court was endorsing the notion that
tying agreements were per se illegal restraints on competition.






In addition to the above test, other aspects of Northern Pacific are im-
portant. First, in discussing the application of the per se rule to proscrip-
tion of certain business practices, Justice Black stated the reason for using
it: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because, of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use."' Secondly, the Clayton Act specifies certain
commodities that are illegal subjects of tying agreements.' In Northern
Pacific the tying product was land, an item not mentioned in the Clayton
Act. However, the Court held the tying of preferential routing agreements
(the tied product) to the sale or lease of land (the tying product) to be
per se illegal under the Sherman Act. Hence, whenever the test for per se
illegality is met, illegal tying agreements can be found even though the
product is not specified in the Clayton Act.
The Northern Pacific test was broadened in United States v. Loew's,
Inc." Distributors of motion picture films conditioned the sale of one or
more copyrighted feature films to television stations upon the purchase of
one or more other films. The Court unanimously held that the tying agree-
ments were in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act because "by their
'inherent nature' and by their 'effect' [they] injuriously restrained trade." 7
The Court refused to accept the argument that the distributors did not
have dominance in the market for television exhibition of feature films-
the "monopolistic position" terminology used in an earlier case. " The
Court held that this was a misconstruction of the applicable legal standard
because " 'sufficient economic power' as contemplated by the Northern
Pacific case is a term more inclusive in scope than 'market dominance.' ,..
Furthermore, sufficient economic power "may be inferred from the tying
product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes.""
Following the reasoning in Loew's it might be possible to find the economic
power over the tying product from its desirability or uniqueness alone.
The use of this as a leverage to bring the tied product into the market
place would be detrimental to competition in the tied product, and would
satisfy the first of the two-part test of Northern Pacific, thus placing the
24 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
22 See notes 7, 8 supra, and accompanying text.
26 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
27 Id. at 49.
2 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), now essentially over-
ruled by Northern Pacific.
29United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 n.5 (1962).
S"Id. at 45. In a footnote to the above quote, Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court,
went on to discuss the aspect of uniqueness and desirability in the tying product as an indication of
economic power:
Since the requisite economic power may be found on the basis of either uniqueness
or consumer appeal, and since market dominance in the present context does not
necessitate a demonstration of market power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act,
it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a full-scale factual
inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying product and into the
corollary problem of the seller's percentage share of the market. This is even more
obviously true when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, in which case
. . . sufficiency of economic power is presumed.
Id. at 45 n.4.
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tying agreement within the per se rule of illegality under the Sherman
Act.
Careful examination of tying agreement cases indicates that there is in
reality another test in addition to the "rule of reason" approach that takes
into consideration all of the economic factors and the "per se" test that sup-
posedly forecloses examination of possible economic harm. This third test
is an "almost" per se test. It is one that is often called a per se test and
applies the per se standards of illegality. However, instead of foreclosing
examination of the particular harm caused by the agreement and only re-
quiring proof of the agreement a and its having fulfilled the per se stand-
ards of illegality, under this third test an examination is nonetheless
made.3"
III. FORTNER ENTERPRISES, INC. V. U.S. STEEL CORP.
In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp." the United States Su-
preme Court held that an agreement tying the purchase of prefabricated
homes to credit may violate the general standards of the Sherman Act. Mr.
Justice Black's reasoning indicates that a plaintiff should have the oppor-
tunity to prove that the defendant exercised sufficient economic power
over the credit market and that the agreement imposed an unreasonable
restraint on competition in the prefabricated home market.
The reasoning follows several steps. First, in distinguishing Fortner from
International Steel and Northern Pacific with respect to the requirements
of whether the agreement need be per se illegal, the Court reasoned that
a plaintiff must meet the standards of Northern Pacific only to bring into
play the per se rule. The district court had held that Fortner had failed to
meet both requirements. However, Justice Black reasoned that this is not
necessary because a Sherman Act violation can be established "on the basis
of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the prac-
tices involved."' At first glance this would appear to be a reversal of the
cases establishing that tying agreements are per se illegal and a return to
the rule of reason approach of examining the economic aspects of the par-
ticular business activity under question. Yet, the remaining steps of Jus-
tice Black's reasoning are based on the test established in Northern Pacific
in which the Court found a per se violation. In fact, Justice Black also
wrote the opinion in Northern Pacific and argued at length why the per se
classification should be established so as to eliminate examination of the
economic aspects." This gives some indication that the Court is backing
"s See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
32 For an extensive discussion of, and arguments against, application of the per se rule, see
Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88;
Baldwin & McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 743
(1963); Baldwin & McFarland, Some Observations on "Per Se" and Tying Arrangements, 6 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 433 (1961); Johnston, Some Twilight Zone Antitrust Problems, 1 ANTITRUST BULL.
615 (1956); Singer, Market Power and Tying Arrangements, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 653 (1963).
It should be noted that in United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (see note 26 supra,
and accompanying text, and note 30 supra), Mr. Justice Goldberg never uses the term "per se."
3 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
34 Id. at 500.
35See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
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away from a strict application of the per se rule and that Fortner is an
example of the "almost" per se test.
Second, Justice Black reasoned that to satisfy the standard of "sufficient
economic power," the defendant need not "have a monopoly or even a
dominant position throughout the market for the tying product."' Eco-
nomic power can be established over something less than all the buyers in a
relevant market. This again appears to be a lessening of the indicia of con-
trol necessary to indicate the forcing of a less desirable product upon a
buyer by tying it to a more desirable product. The Court's holding appar-
ently means that only "some of the buyers" need be affected to establish
the requisite economic power.
Third, Justice Black cited Loew's in support of the argument that the
defendants' unique terms were a possible indication of economic power."
This, without other indications of economic power, is the most difficult step
of the reasoning to justify. If one really had economic control over a par-
ticular product, he would usually raise prices rather than lower them.
However, the uniqueness and desirability of a product, when coupled with
a lower price and offered solely on the condition that the buyer accept a
less desirable product, can be an indication that the seller is willing to take
a loss on the desirable product in order to increase sales on the less desirable
product. This ability to take a loss in another area has often been indicative
of great economic power. Hence, the Court is not holding that the tying
agreement is per se illegal, but is rather looking at the economic effects of
the particular business practice involved. 8
The dissent in Fortner raises the specter that the majority opinion would
invalidate all credit purchases, reasoning that in fact when any purchase
is made on credit the purchase is tied to the credit terms."' Therefore, upon
showing unique credit terms, economic power can be inferred, and there-
by "the mere fact that the credit is offered on uniquely advantageous terms
makes the transaction a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.""
The majority disagreed, reasoning that the selling of items on credit is "a
far cry from the arrangement involved here, where the credit is provided
by one corporation on condition that a product be purchased from a sep-
arate corporation, and where the borrower contracts to obtain a large
sum of money over and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical
products purchased." 1 Nonetheless, this will probably be one of the biggest
questions to evolve from this decision. For the first time in an antitrust
suit alleging an illegal tying agreement, the use of money or credit as the
tying product has been attacked. Previous cases have held that for a tying
product to evidence a per se violation of the antitrust laws, it must be
shown that the seller of the tying product had sufficient economic power
36 394 U.S. at 502 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
as Justice Black gives two other, but subsidiary, indicia of economic power: (1) the nationwide
operations of the credit corporation, and (2) that other lending institutions-banks and mortgage
comPanies-might have been prohibited by statute from offering the same terms. Id. at 505-06.
"/'d. at 514, 519. (Fortner was decided by a 5-4 majority.)401d. at 516.41 Id. at 507.
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over that product. Therefore, considering the relative ease with which
the majority indicates that economic power can be shown, the potentiality
of a lender to exercise economic power over the supply of money is of no
small significance.
Significantly, in Fortner the Court reversed a summary judgment and
remanded the case for trial. Thus, despite the Court's interpretation of
the legal questions decided by the lower court, material questions of fact
remain to be determined. This is important because the Court held that
Fortner was entitled to present evidence concerning the economic effects of
the agreement within the general standards of the Sherman Act.' That
credit might be capable of being a tying product would seem to depend on
the economic proof that could be mustered in court. That the case was
remanded is also important because there seems to be a question, depending
on which party one listens to, of whether plaintiff was approached by
defendants to enter into a credit agreement that tied with it the purchase
of homes, or whether plaintiff was offered the homes with defendant in-
cluding a credit arrangement to finance the purchase. 3 The determination
of this fact issue would bear on the question of whether Fortner affects
general credit purchases. Were it to be proven in court that the latter of
the above conflicting stories was what actually happened, the importance
of Fortner would be greatly dissipated. This would be a reversal of which
of the two products was the tying product and would materially explode
the basis upon which the majority reached its conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fortner appears to be based on the International Salt-Northern Pacific-
Loew's line of reasoning and at the same time appears to be backing away
from it. The determination of whether or not the defendants exercised
economic power over the tying product was based on the rationale de-
veloped by this line of cases. However, the Court also held that the plain-
tiff need not necessarily be required to meet the standards of the per se
rule of illegality, but may be allowed to present evidence of the total eco-
nomic effect of the tying agreement to prove it illegal under the Sherman
Act. Hence, tying agreements are not necessarily illegal per se. Rather,
they might be illegal based on their total economic effect if the require-
ments of Northern Pacific are met: (1) that the defendant exerts eco-
nomic power over the tying product so that its exertion of this power
through the tied product would be an illegal restraint on competition in
the market for the tied product; and (2) that a not insubstantial amount
of interstate commerce is affected. In what is probably an understatement
this appears to be a contradiction. Apparently, Fortner stands as an example
of the third, though never stated, test of "almost" per se illegality. In an
42 See note 34 suPra, and accompanying text.
' Interestingly, the majority opinion is based on plaintiff's version of the facts, while one of the
two dissenting opinions seems to have adopted the defendants' version that the agreement was one
to purchase the homes with a credit arrangement to finance that purchase. 394 U.S. at 519-20. This
confusion gives additional support for the case being remanded.
1969]
